Thursday, 24 November 2016

IoT Security Resources

This is a list of useful documentation and links for anyone interested in IoT security, either for building products or as general reference material. The list is alphabetical and doesn't denote any priority. I'll maintain this and update it as new documentation gets published. Please feel free to add links in the comments and I will add them to the list.

Privacy-specific:


Updates:

24th November 2016: Added GSMA self-assessment checklist, Cloud Security Alliance research paper, Symantec paper and AT&T CEO's guide.
5th December 2016: Added GSMA, Nominet and OLSWANG IoT privacy links as well as AIOTI security link.

Saturday, 22 October 2016

Dead on Arrival? What's next for IoT security?

IoT security is in the news again and it is pretty grim reading. The DynDNS distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack caused many major websites to go offline. Let's be clear - there are many security companies who have suddenly dumped all the insecure webcams and routers that have been out there for years into the new world of the Internet of Things. It is semantic perhaps, but I think somewhat opportunistic because much of the kit is older and generally not your new-to-market IoT products. There is however a big issue with insecure IoT products being sold and if not today, tomorrow will bring further, much worse attacks using compromised IoT devices across the world.



We’re at the stage where we’re connecting more physical things and those things are often quite weak from a security point of view. It appears that it has only just occurred to some people that these devices can be harnessed to perform coordinated attacks on services companies and people rely on (or individuals in the case of Brian Krebs).

I fully agree with Bruce Schneier and others who have said that this is one area where government needs to step in and mandate that security needs to be baked in rather than half-baked. The market isn’t going to sort itself out any time soon, but mitigation, both technical and non-technical can be taken in the interim. This does not mean that I am expecting marks or stickers on products (they don’t work).

There are some quite straightforward measures that can be requested before a device is sold and some standards and recommendations and physical technology is available to create secure products. Some of the vulnerabilities are simply unforgivable in 2016 and the competence of these companies to be able to sell internet connected products at all has to be questioned. Those of us who are in industry often see the same companies time and time again and yet nothing ever really happens to them – they still go on selling products with horribly poor levels of security. The Mirai botnet code released in September targets connected devices such as routers and surveillance cameras because they have default passwords that have not been changed by the user / owner of the device. We all know what they are: admin, admin / admin, password and so on. http://www.routerpasswords.com/ has a good list. With Mirai, the devices are telnetted into on port 23 and hey presto, turned around for attack.

I did notice that there is an outstanding bug in the Mirai code to be resolved however, on github: “Bug: Fails to destroy the Internet #8”

Your company has to have a security mindset if you are creating a connected product. Every engineer in your organisation has to have security in mind. It is often easy to spot the companies that don’t if you know what you are looking for.

Is there another way?

At the grandly titled World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA) starting next week in Tunisia, many countries are attempting to go further and introduce an alternative form of information management based around objects at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (the so-called Digital Object Architecture (DOA) technology). Some want this to be mandated for IoT. It is worth having a look at what is being proposed because we are told that the Digital Object Architecture is both secure and private. Great, surely this is what we need to help us? Yet, when we dive a bit deeper, that doesn’t seem to be the case at all. I won’t give chapter and verse here, but I’ll point to a couple of indicators:

According to information handle.net, the DOA relies on proprietary software for the handle system which resolves digital object identifiers. Version 8.1 released in 2016 has some information at: https://www.handle.net/download_hnr.html where we discover that:

Version 8 will run on most platforms with Java 6 or higher.

A quick internet search reveals that Java 6 was released in 2006 and reveals plenty of issues. For example "Java 6 users vulnerable to zero day flaw, security experts warn" from 2013. This excerpt from the articles states “While Java 6 users remain vulnerable, the bug has been patched in Java 7. Java 6 has been retired, which means that updates are only available to paying clients.”

Another quick internet search discovers “cordra.org”. Cordra is described “as a core part of CNRI’s Digital Object Architecture”. In the technical manual from January 2016 on that site, we find information on default passwords (login: admin, password: changeit).

"Cordra - a core part of the Digital Object Architecture" - default passwords

If it looks bad, it usually is.

These things are like canaries – once you see them you end up asking more questions about what kinds of architectural security issues and vulnerabilities this software contains. What security evaluation has any of this stuff been through and who are the developers? Who has tested it at all? I’ll come back to the privacy bit at a future date.

The Digital Object Architecture is not secure.

Don’t kid yourself that the DOA is going to be any more resilient than our existing internet – the documentation also shows it is based on the same technologies we rely on for our existing internet: PKI based security, relying on encryption algorithms that have to be deprecated and replaced when it gets broken. I’m not sure how it would hold up against a DDoS attack of any sort. What this object based internet seems to give us though is a license. There are many interesting parts to it, including that it seems that CNRI can now kill the DOA at will just by terminating the license:

“Termination: This License Agreement may be terminated, at CNRI’s sole discretion, upon a material breach of its terms and conditions by Licensee.”

So would I use this for the Internet of Things? No! I’ve touched the tip of the iceberg here. It seems fragile and flaky at best, probably non-functioning at worst. Let’s be honest – the technology has not been tested at scale, it currently has to deal with a small 100s of thousands of resolutions, rather than the billions the internet has to. I can't imagine that it would have been able to handle "1.2 terabits per second of data". Operating at internet scale is a whole different ball game and this is what some people just don't get – incidentally the IETF members pointed this out to CNRI researchers back in the early 2000s on the IETF mailing lists (I will try to dig out the link at some point to add here).

Summary

Yes, we need to get better, but let’s first work together and get on the case with device security. We also need to get better at sinkholing and dropping traffic which can flood networks through various different means, including future measures such as protocol re-design. Some people have said to just block port 23 as an immediate measure (blocking telnet access). There’ll be many future attacks that really do use the Internet of Things but that doesn’t mean we have to tear up our existing internet to provide an even less secure, untested version with the DOA. The grass is not always greener on the other side.

Some more links to recommendations on IoT security can be found below:

Other bodies are also doing work on security but at an earlier stage including the W3C's Web of Things working group


Edit: 30/10/16 - typos and added IETF list


Thursday, 19 May 2016

Improving Anti-Theft Measures for Mobile Devices

I'm pleased to say that the latest version of the GSMA SG.24 Anti-Theft Device Feature Requirements has been published. Many members of the Device Security Group I chair at the GSMA have been personally committed to trying to reduce the problem of mobile theft over many years. This represents just one small part of these continued efforts.

There is no magic solution to the problem of mobile theft as I've discussed many times (some listed below). The pragmatic approach we've taken is to openly discuss this work with all the interested parties including OS vendors such as Apple, Google and Microsoft as well as to reach out to Police and government particularly in the US and the UK where the subject has been of high interest. We've taken their feedback and incorporated it into the work. Everyone has a part to play in reducing theft of mobile devices, not least the owner of the device itself.



Some extra resources:

Some previous blogs on mobile theft:


Friday, 29 April 2016

Introducing the work of the IoT Security Foundation

At Mobile World Congress this year, I agreed to give an interview introducing the IoT Security Foundation to Latin American audiences. If you're interested in IoT security and our work at the Foundation, you should find this video interesting. Enjoy!

IoT Security from Rafael A. Junquera on Vimeo.


Friday, 8 April 2016

Improving IoT Security

I am involved in a few initiatives aimed at improving IoT security. My company wrote the original IoT security strategy for the GSMA and we have been involved ever since, culminating in the publication of a set of IoT Security Guidelines which can be used by device manufacturers through to solution providers and network operators. Here's a short video featuring me and other industry security experts explaining what we're doing.





There's still a long way to go with IoT security and we've still got to change the "do nothing" or "it's not our problem" mindset around big topics like safety when it comes to the cyber physical world. Each step we take along the road is one step closer to better security in IoT and these documents represent a huge leap forward.

Thursday, 24 March 2016

IoT Security and Privacy – Sleep-Walking into a Living Nightmare?

This is my remote presentation to the IoT Edinburgh event from the 24th of March 2016. It was a short talk and if you want to follow the slides, they're also embedded below. The talk doesn't cover much technical detail but is hopefully an interesting introduction to the topic. 



There is a much longer version of the connected home talk that goes into much more depth (and talks about how we solve it). I hope to record and upload that at some point! Slides for this one:


Victim blaming when it comes to fraud

I was quoted today in a Guardian article after the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe suggested that fraud victims should not be compensated by banks in cyber crime situations.

Image of what people are being conditioned to think a cyber criminal looks like! (Or perhaps I should have gone with hacker in hoodie?!)

His point is that people use weak passwords and don't upgrade their systems so end up as easy pickings for online criminals. Whilst of course users need to take responsibility for their own actions (or inaction) it is nowhere near as simple as that, especially when it comes to things like deliberate social engineering of people and website insecurity.

My full quote was as follows: "I think the Met Chief's comments are short-sighted. There are many reasons consumers are defrauded and a lot of those are not really things that they can control. To trivialise these to all being about user concerns misses the point. How does a consumer control the theft of their data from a website for example? We all have a role to play and a lot of work is underway in bodies like the worldwide web consortium (W3C) to reduce the use of passwords and to increase the use of hardware-backed security. The banks are doing a good job in a difficult environment but they are ultimately responsible for identifying and preventing fraud issues when they occur."

The W3C's work on web authentication is underway, which will standardise the work of the FIDO Alliance for the web in order to help eliminate the password. This of course will take a while and we won't fully eliminate passwords from the web for many years. To further protect consumers, there is another effort to bring hardware security backing to important elements of the web, this will also hopefully be chartered to do that in W3C. In the software updates world, Microsoft have led the way on desktops and Apple in mobile for ensuring people are patched quickly and effectively. We still have a long way to go and I'm leading some work in the mobile industry, through the GSMA to try and make things better.

The Met and the wider police have a key role in investigating cyber crime, something they've not done well at all over the past few years, so they have failed consumers repeatedly. Blaming users is something akin to throwing stones in glasshouses.